World Alliance News Letter

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An End to Illusions

THE crisis has reached a crisis. Sputniks I and II have had an effect on the West that is wider and deeper than military. They have proced a crisis of nerve: they have shattered the est's illusions, destroyed its tranquillity, and ced it to take a new look at reality.

Myths die hard, and for a long time we have nforted ourselves with a myth: the myth of Rusn "backwardness" and of American "know-how." e have taken it as an article of faith that whatr the Soviets could do we could do better. Both chologically and strategically we have acted on this faith. Well, now we know better, and knowledge is hard to take.

We have nursed another illusion, too—the illun that in the international struggle, virtue is its n reward. The American secular "religion" is ed on this illusion: if you are good, then you l triumph over the wicked; the righteous will sper (and oh, how righteous we are) and the ked will go down to defeat. We should long e have reread the Book of Job.

Whatever else, then, may be said about the triphs of Soviet science, we can say that they have dered the United States a service in ending its vete. By bringing to it an intimation of its own rtality, they have prepared the nation for the struggles that lie ahead.

Or is this wishful thinking? A nation, practically, o greater, no wiser than its leaders. And though Sputniks have written a message across the vens, the eyes of official Washington seem rminedly fixed on earth. We have yet to hear words from the White House to indicate that t has happened is more than an annoying, ly temporary setback. Inconvenient, of course; alarming, no. The suggestion has been that a little trimming here and a little skimping e, the nation can continue to have its cake and t, too. The Sputniks have prepared us to hear d, sweat and tears. So far we have heard keep ing and chins up.

Mr. Dulles, indeed, has suggested a theological anation for the Soviet lead in satellites: it may have resulted from the fact that we are religious and the Communists are godless. The best Russian minds are devoted to science, while many of the brightest American young men, Mr. Dulles has observed, enter theological schools.)

There is a danger, then, that what should be for the nation a moment of truth might be made an excuse for self-deception. This must not be allowed to happen.

What the Sputniks have dramatized is the need for a radical reexamination and, where it is needed, a drastic revision of our national outlook and strategy in the Cold War. And they have dramatized, too, how short the time for this may be. Because, if recent events have proved nothing else, they have proved this: time is now on *their* side.

THE first fruit of a reexamination of the national purpose should be a somber recognition of how dangerous a phase of the international struggle—with what horrible possibilities—we have now entered. This is not a time for easy reassurance; it is a time for difficult, painful dedication.

The nation does not need—it cannot afford—pep-talks. It must be reminded, in the words of one American statesman, that "there are no gains without pains, that this is the eve of great decisions, not easy ones, like resistance when you're attacked." It must be summoned to deal with "the stark reality of responsibility in an hour of history haunted with [the] grim, gaunt specter of strife, dissension and materialism at home, and ruthless, inscrutable, and hostile power abroad."

The Soviet lead in missiles can not be narrowed if America follows any business-as-usual policy. More than a missiles-czar is needed to cure our defense inadequacies. We must be ready to pay the bills. We must be prepared for higher taxes, for national austerity if necessary. The issue at stake is survival.

But more than a military problem is involved here. The military problem, in fact, is only the beginning. *If*, through a great national effort, we can regain a balance of power in weapons with the

Soviet Union, *if* the world's sorry peace can be maintained through the "balance of terror," then our problems have just begun. Our ultimate issues with the Soviet Union are not military, they are political. A final victory or defeat will probably depend not on arms, but on ideas.

WE have heard, again and again, that the important battle is for the minds of men. Too many of us have dismissed this as a liberal cliché. But, like most clichés, it is true. Communism's ultimate weapon is political. So must be ours.

We must be willing, as a nation, to pay the price for political warfare as well as for armaments. We must expand our whole concept of foreign aid. At the same time as we work to close the weapons gap between us and the Soviet Union, we must work, with equal sacrifice, to alleviate those economic ills of the world that give Communism its greatest appeal. If the Sputniks should drive us to concentrate solely on the military challenge of the Cold War, the Soviet Union will have won a victory beyond its greatest hopes.

Not only the "uncommitted" nations of the world but our allies as well are waiting for reassurance from the United States. Not the reassurance that all is well, because obviously all is far from well. What is waited for is the reassurance that the United States knows that its past efforts, military and political, have not been good enough, that a new, much more difficult effort must be made. And many in the United States await such reassurance, too.

A New Publication

WITH this issue the *World Alliance News Letter* completes thirty-three years of publication. Since 1924 some three hundred and thirty issues of the publication have been widely distributed among religious and educational leaders concerned with world affairs. As a publication of The Church Peace Union the *News Letter's* effort has been to clarify and extend the Union's special concern: the work for world peace through religion, the relating of ethics to foreign affairs.

The Church Peace Union, in an effort to increase its effectiveness, now plans to revise the *News Letter's* format and to increase the number of its pages. This is the last month in which the publication will appear under its present title and with its present style.

Beginning next month a new publication, which will be the successor to the *News Letter*, will appear. Its title will be *Worldview;* it will number twelve pages, and will appear twelve times a year.

Worldview's concerns will be the continuing concerns of The Church Peace Union. Its specific function will be to provide an effective forum for ideas related to ethics and foreign affairs. Its increased number of pages will make possible the introduction of new columns, special features, and more extensive editorial comment. And, needless to say, it is hoped that the new publication's influence and readership will grow too.

The first issue of *Worldview* will be circulated in early January, 1958.

RECOMMENDED MAGAZINE ARTICLES

Russia's Revolution Forty Years Later by Michael Karpovich, Boris Souvarine. (*The New Leader*, November 4, 1957.)

In two timely articles, the Bolshevik conquest of November 1917 is seen, not as an inevitable phase of the Revolution, but as "an armed coup against a defenseless government, led by a military committee on behalf of a minority party."

The Arab Refugees by William Pfaff. (*The Commonweal*, November 8, 1957.)

The problems of resettling the nine hundred thousand dispossessed Arabs of the Middle East will take at least ten years to solve, writes Mr. Pfaff. But the immediate danger is that the UN's rehabilitation fund—on which the refugees subsist—will be exhausted before next summer.

Piety and Secularism in America by Reinhold Niebuhr. (*The Atlantic Monthly*, November 1957.)

"We are more religious and more secular than any other nation . . . by the effect of definitely ascertainable historic causes peculiar to the American experience." Dr. Niebuhr, writing in *The Atlantic's* centennial issue, analyzes the relation of piety to secularism in our technical age.

Would an Independent Algeria Strengthen or Weaken the West? (*Western World*, October 1957.)

In this debate, Senator Estes Kefauver, in the interests of the Atlantic Community, upholds the right of Algeria to choose eventual independence. His opponent, Marcel-Edmond Naegelen of the French Socialist Party, fears than an independent Algeria would be a Communist Algeria.

The Passing of the European Order by Herbert Luthy. (*Encounter*, November 1957.)

"Europe's colonization of the world was neither a chain of crimes nor a chain of beneficence, it was the birth of the modern world itself." Europe's failure to keep pace with the movements of an order it had itself created is illumined in a brilliant and vigorous essay.

The Suez Crisis and the Containment Policy by M. A. Fitzsimons. (*The Review of Politics*, October 1957.)

In tracing the events leading up to and away from the Suez crisis, Professor Fitzsimons presents a full and complex picture of the converging interests and policies at work in the Middle East today.

Arguments About Red China

In Partisan Debate the Real Alternatives Are Oversimplified or Obscured.

James T. Farrell

WHENEVER discussion of major issues, either of domestic or of foreign policy, sinks to the level of passionate name-calling and militant petition of stereotypes, we, the public, are the losers. l we learn is something about the psychological akeup of the disputants. We are asked to choose sides the basis of prejudice, not facts and reasons. Great ues are thus degraded to a clash of partisanships.

Such has been the history of debate in the United ates on the question of recognizing Red China. In ct this question has become so saturated with passion at rational discussion of it even now seems impos-le. There have been more than black-and-white, yes-no alternatives open to the American government in handling of the China problem, but partisan rav-g has prevented an honest examination of what the l possibilities were.

Since mankind entered the space age with Sputnik however, it has become more than ever necessary to examine the possibilities. Inescapably, foreign policy anges. Diplomacy is a game of power and the final arantee of a policy is force. The co-relationships of ce and power in the international scene are being ered. This is not a moment when it is useful or nsible to maintain an inflexible line on any issue of eign policy. Like other great questions, the question our attitude toward Red China must constantly be oked at anew. I do not attempt to suggest any an-ers here, but merely to indicate what the situation tually *is*.

T is notorious that various of the non-Communist liberals originally made conceptual and analytical stakes concerning the character of the Chinese volution. Some of them accepted the partial and e-sided interpretation of it as "an agrarian revolu-n"; they thought of it as being "historically in-table." (During the heat of action, almost nothing ms inevitable; after the action, almost everything pears to have been inevitable.) This interpretation s by now been completely demolished, however, and s no longer necessary even to consider it.

A more serious argument, now frequently heard, is that by recognizing Red China the United States can induce Mao Tse-tung to become a Marshal Tito. But this argument, too, seems to me to be empty. Tito did not break with Stalin because President Truman moved him with money or other gifts. He broke because he faced the alternatives—independence or death. He sensibly chose not to die. We can assume that he was reasonably certain that if he broke with Stalin he could get American and Western aid if he needed it. But most certainly, he did not break merely in order to receive this aid.

Tito was endangered because he could not develop Yugoslavia if he followed the strict patterns of Stalinist economics and allowed Yugoslavia to become a mere satellite. He could not depend on a big force of slave laborers as could Stalin. He lacked Stalin's resources and manpower. Stalinist economics broke down and almost wrecked Hungary and Poland. And since Tito had the Carpathian Mountains—a difficult terrain—plus control of the Yugoslav army, the police and the party, he was able to break—and to outlive Stalin.

The popular "liberal" analogy between Yugoslavia and Red China breaks down for a further reason. As Karl Wittfogel observed in a monograph, Communist China is a junior partner of the Soviet Union, not a satellite. China (unlike, say, East Germany) is not being looted for the Russian economy. To the contrary, Mao receives machinery and other goods from the Soviet Union, and during the final stages of the Korean War, Communist China became a real drain on Russia and the satellite countries because of its military needs. A United Nations report has even suggested that a remote cause of the Hungarian Revolution was the strain on the Hungarian economy imposed by the Soviet Union because of the Korean War.

Given the relationship between China and Russia, therefore, what have we to offer Mao that can match what Russia can give and promise? One day, Mao Tse-tung or one of his successors may be given atom and hydrogen bombs or missiles by the Kremlin. The United States will not, can not, compete with the Kremlin here. Nor, if Mao should break with Khrushchev, would Washington be likely to provide him with the first class weapons he would need to defend himself

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against a possible Russian attack. The Soviet Union is still the strongest military and industrial power in Asia. And Khrushchev, like Stalin before him, can promise Mao loot if and when Red China is ready to expand.

Finally, Mao is responsible for the execution of many of his countrymen, probably millions of them. If there is anything in his character or career which suggests that he can be wooed or bought—and cheaply at that—he has concealed it. He is not the purchasable kind. Liberals who imagine that by recognition we can seduce him are playing at a "power politics" that is naive beyond belief.

Still, Red China is a fact; it exists. And sooner or later we have to accept facts. As the liberals argue, we cannot permanently exclude a nation of six hundred million from the human race or deny that the government ruling them is a power. It is obvious that sooner or later the United States will either want to, or be forced to, change its policy toward Red China.

The United States, of course, still recognizes Chiang Kai-shek as the "ruler" of China, and Nationalist sources talk of discontent and possible revolution on the mainland. We know, after Hungary, that there certainly *is* disaffection. Discontent is a chronic condition in a totalitarian dictatorship, especially a Communist one. Is the possibility of revolution a sound argument for our continuing our present policy?

The Red Army ruthlessly repressed the Hungarian Revolution. If there should be a revolution in Red China, will Khrushchev stand idly by? Dare he? And if he does not dare to, will the United States be ready to go in? Should the United States go in, what would be the reaction of the Chinese and other Asians? Or if there should be a revolution in Red China, would the entire Communist world go up in the flames of revolution?

Other arguments cited for continuing the non-recognition policy are that Red China will decay and go to ruin, or that it will develop and even possibly move toward some form of democracy. These prospects, however, I would exclude offhand. Perhaps in time, but in a rather long time, friction will develop between the Soviet Union and Red China. But we must remember that friction is not war. And it is likely that the Soviet Union will remain the most powerful of the two Communist nations for decades to come.

THIS, in brief, is the situation. We cannot hope either that we can cheaply "buy" Mao or that he and all his works will conveniently disappear or evolve into some Western-style democracy. We have the *fact* of Red China. We also have obligations to defend Japan, to come to the aid of Vietnam, to aid South Korea, and to defend Chiang Kai-shek, along with the Communist soldiers who defected and are in Formosa. Because for us to sacrifice Chiang and these soldiers Communist butchery would be an act of immoral from which the conscience of this nation could not cover. We cannot hand Formosa over to Mao as price for a settlement.

It is suggested in some liberal circles that one w out of the dilemma of Formosa is to place the isla under a United Nations trusteeship. By sheer force, by cutting off all funds, the United States could p sibly force such an outcome. The United States, ho ever, is not in a position simply to turn Formosa ov to the UN. And even if this could be done, one resu would be trouble in Korea. There would also be tro ble in Japan—a growth of Communist influence and wave of appeasement sentiments.

Had the United States made a package deal wi Red China some two years ago, it is conceivable th Formosa might then have been made a UN trusteeshi and tension in the Far East might then have be eased. But, in any event, in the past two years Ame ica's position has declined. It will probably be son years before U.S. prestige again runs high in Sout east Asia. A rich and powerful white nation, the al of Great Britain and France, cannot force psychologic and historical processes among the Asian peoples.

Voting approval of Red China's admission to th UN would go hand-in-hand with diplomatic recogn tion. If this did not occur as a result of a firmly gua anteed package deal, the difficulties for the UN wou only be multiplied. For the United States to gra recognition now and then vote for admission to th UN without something in return would constitute serious diplomatic defeat for the United States. An what would the United States want which Red Chin would be ready to give? Free elections in Korea? Gua antees for, say, Malaya, Burma, Singapore, Thailan Laos, and Formosa? How could these guarantees b given in such a manner as to be truly firm?

Red China would deny intentions on any territori except Formosa which she claims. And the danger, i any event, is not primarily military. While we can b certain that there is a Communist expansionist pla and dream in Asia, this a matter of the future. Th Communists, having lost a revolt in Indonesia, ar most likely to try and expand by infiltration and wearing process rather than armed attack.

This is the predicament in which America finds i self. The Far East cannot be locked off as a region un related to other areas. Even though we are here dea ing with the Chinese question, and even though Com munist China is best described as Russia's junior par ner, the real issue is between the United States and th Soviet Union. And what happens between these super powers is likely to determine what happens in the Fa East.

Partisanship and the Truth

John Cogley

I'LL tell you what is bothering me. How does a writer keep himself from getting such a vested interest in certain ideas that he feels called upon to come to their rescue when they are attacked, mainly because he feels that an attack on them is an attack on him?

In the beginning a writer is like a blank piece of paper. But if you want to be a writer you have to write about something, and you begin to take positions on questions of the day. You study a situation and try to see it whole; you think about the issues involved and weigh them; finally you reach a conclusion. You set down your conclusions on paper. One conclusion leads to another. Once you are known for the kind of conclusions you habitually reach, you are assigned to what is called a school of thought.

No one registers for a school of thought; the matriculation is gradual. But even the most independent minds discover one day that, lo, they are wearing an old school tie. Maybe the tie is called liberal, maybe conservative, maybe middle-of-the-road; it does not matter much. The important thing is that one's thinking is now regarded as part of a group effort. The writer begins to think of Us one way and of Them another way. He begins to feel a tug of loyalty every time he sits down to a typewriter. It is not necessarily loyalty to the truth but to a partisan interest, for the writer, who never intended to, has become a partisan and can very easily find himself affected with a partisan's myopic view of things.

The writer does not necessarily become a liar, though some do. But if he finds himself paring and shaping the truth he deals with, for the good of the "cause"—however nebulous the cause might be—he is the next thing to a liar. Worst of all, of course, he can deceive himself. He can tell himself that he is justified in withholding this truth and playing up that—for after all should he give aid to the enemy or scandal to the little ones? Or he may deceive himself that he is preserving a respectful silence out of consideration for the transcendent claim of a higher truth. The Truth which is the Party, the Movement or the Cause makes its claim, and the separate truths which are the description of immediate realities are slightly distorted and even flatly denied. How many liars have lied for Truth! Only the totalitarians endow deception of this kind with the dignity of doctrine; but even honest men are bedeviled by the temptation.

This is not the kind of column in which one should mention names. I will not cite examples. But study the work of journalists, especially those who deal in ideas. How many are like campaign orators? All wisdom is found in their camp. The opposition never has a case; its position is not the product of earnest study or careful attention to the facts—it is the fruit of blind prejudice at best and callous iniquity at worst. The truth, they lead you to believe, finds its only servants in their camp—and, *mirabile dictu,* it just happens that the truth in any given instance serves their partisan interests.

I do not hold with the conspiracy thesis. I do not believe that writers are bought out by powerful interests. Very few can be bought if only because, for the kind of people who become writers, pride is a much greater temptation than greed. But buying them would not be necessary in any case.

The *National Review* speaks of the Liberal Establishment, which I take it is not supposed to be a conspiracy but a product of mindless conformity. The so-called Right Wing is often described as an Establishment along the same lines. There is a grain of fact in the charge that such establishments exist. Each establishment of course tries to give the impression that its existence is explained by the hold the truth has on good men who can think, while the other evolved from witless men plunging beyond their depth. But suppose we dismiss such *partis pris* absurdities for the moment and ask why such establishments do exist.

I think they exist, among other reasons, because writers tend to get this vested interest in certain ideas, as do magazine and newspaper editors, and come to feel as protective about them as a doting parent.

Unless ideas, even well thought-out ideas, are the product of infallibility, there is usually some truth to be found in the attacks made on them. Nor are factual truths always of immediate service to even the best ideas. So a truly honest writer must root for the opposing team now and then; he may even find that a sincere devotion to the truth will turn him temporarily into a traitor to the partisan cause. He may find from time to time that he has to cross the lines on a specific issue, to the dismay and disapproval of those who had thought of him as one of "ours." But if the writer wants to stay honest he has no other choice. Reality simply does not shape itself, nor should it be shaped, to conform to even the most noble cause.

In the long run the writer's real obligation is to the reality of things; only secondarily can he be a partisan. The honest writer, I am afraid, will always be an untrustworthy partisan. But such are the appeals and the claims of partisanship that only few writers realize when they have ceased to be honest.

That is what is bothering me.

Mr. Cogley is a Trustee of The Church Peace Union and a member of the Fund for the Republic's executive staff. His observations are reprinted from the November 15, 1957 issue of *The Commonweal.*

Peace For Algeria, Honor For France

Lieutenant in Algeria by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. Alfred A. Knopf. 231 pp. $3.50.

By James Greene

THE Algerian War is now three years old. It began with a group of fanatic rebels—*fellagha*—demanding independence for Algeria, and few people suspected at the outset that these would be able to withstand the full might of the French Army. Nevertheless, some thirty-six months later the war goes on, the number of *fellagha* has grown, over fifty thousand persons have lost their lives, and France finds itself at the brink of bankruptcy with the need to support four hundred thousand troops on Algerian soil. Clearly, something has gone disastrously wrong in Algeria.

In a startling book, *Lieutenant in Algeria,* the brilliant French journalist and publisher of Paris' *L'Express,* Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber attempts to do for the Algerian war what twenty years ago George Orwell did for the Spanish Civil War—to pay it "homage," to respect it by recognizing all its causes, to sweep past the flag-waving and place before the critical intelligence the selfishness and fanaticism that are rendering solutions impossible. A supreme patriot, Servan-Schreiber feels that France's soul is now in Algeria "waiting to be saved."

The territorial French in Algeria are demanding that the rebels be given no quarter; they demand immediate retaliation against the Arabs—innocent and guilty alike—for atrocities committed by the *fellagha.* The French Army, Servan-Schreiber believes, has all too easily fallen in with the demands of the Territorials, when reason and humanity should have dictated a role for the troops as "referee," interested only in stopping the conflict.

Instead, bloody repression has earned the Army the enmity of those uncommitted Arabs that were the African nation's sole source of moderation. It has sent many into the camp of the Algerian nationalists and prolonged Algeria's bitter agony. More, it has placed the French Army in a position from which it must finally retreat. This retreat will be a defeat, and Servan-Schreiber doubts the French nation can sustain another "defeat."

FOR six months Servan-Schreiber served as a reserve officer in Algeria. The book he has written is based upon his experiences, but told in narrative style through the mouths of officers and men he knew. In their sympathies, these Frenchmen run the gamut from "pacification"—the official French policy in all of French Africa—to the outright blind repression demanded by the Territorials.

There is the officer Martin, who tells the new recruits that "there's only one way: treat every Arab as a suspect, a possible *fellagha,* a potential terrorist—because that, my dear sir, is the truth." At the other end, and also serving in Algeria, is Marcus, who tells the author that "what the Arabs hated was the colonial set-up; they didn't really hate France. The Army should have been independent of the colonial set-up . . . If it had acted as a referee, it could have changed the nature of the problem to be solved. It did the very opposite."

Marcus, and with him Servan-Schreiber, formed squads for the purpose of re-establishing contact with the Arab population. The scenes in which these men attempt to win back for France at least the trust of these people are among the most eloquent in the book. But their efforts, which could have been a "corner of poetry in a dark and disillusioning war" but were perhaps in any case doomed to failure, were completely thwarted by French units swinging across the countryside on so-called "gook hunts," in answer to the Territorials' demands. Since no *fellagha* would wait around for such an expedition, the victims of these hunts were usually innocent persons.

But Servan-Schreiber reminds his countrymen that not all the elements prolonging the war are in Algeria. In France itself the Territorials have strong influence in the National Assembly, and Ministers are enlisted to silence all effective opposition. Thus independence for Algeria is left to be the cry of the Communists in the Assembly and the process of polarization continues.

Successive Governments of France have been unable to place before the Assembly a plan acceptable to all. The Bourges-Maunoury regime fell on a vote on its Algerian plan; the new Gaillard Government has adopted the very same plan because no other is immediately available.

But probably the greatest casualty in the Algerian War is the morals of the French people. Again, the eloquent Marcus goes to the heart of the matter: "Remember this: what with the reservists, the draftees and regular Army men, it's an entire generation that's passing through our hands. We're turning them into moral failures, sometimes into monsters. We could turn them into heroes, or—let's skip the big word—into men."

France, with larger possessions in Africa than any other colonial power, is now without a colonial "policy." Word of the Algerian repressions is slowly seeping into French West and French Equatorial Africa and shaking the entire French Union.

Obviously, Servan-Schreiber sees re-establishment of contact with the Arabs coupled with effective pressure on the Territorial French to reduce their demands as the only possible avenue to peace in Algeria. Without them he sees Algeria emerging finally from the hostilities, independent and blood-thirstily

—Mr. Greene, a regular contributor to *The Commonweal* and other periodicals, is European-African Editor of *Business International.*

anco-phobe. With this result, the rritorials would be driven from land they have inhabited for er a century.

/ERE it not for the dramatic immediacy it attempts to serve, s book would be a beautifully ignant story of men attempting remain men before the dehuman- ng pressures of every war. But atever the outcome of the con- t, Servan-Schreiber's book will nain as a "homage" to the com- xity of human affairs, to the ndness that comes upon men in nflict, and to those heroic few who, like Marcus and Servan-Schreiber himself, preserve their reason in the high-flood of passion. More immediately, *Lieutenant in Algeria* might be the clarion call that will waken a great nation to impending disaster.

There is an interesting postscript to this book. Servan-Schreiber sent his story to several of the persons whose portraits are included in it. Some of these had returned to France, some were still in Algeria. A collection of their replies, critical and laudatory, is placed at the end of the volume. All the letters confirm the basic truth of the story—though inevitably they point out some omissions.

Servan-Schreiber, for instance, in his wrath at the stupidity of some Territorials omits all mention of the genuine hospitality shown to the Army by others. Nor is there any indication that there are Territorials who stop short before the policy of blind retaliation, although some of them actually do.

These letters, then, supply further close observations that can only serve Servan-Schreiber's ultimate causes—the truth, peace for Algeria, honor for France.

SUGGESTED READING

e Reformation by Will Durant. Simon and Schuster. 5 pp. $7.50

The sixth installment in the author's "Story of Civilization" presents a vivid and crucial era from the viewpoint of a humanist.

e Living God by Romano Guardini. Translated by Stanley dman. Pantheon Books. $2.75.

This series of lectures and meditations by a leading Catholic theologian summons the reader to a perception of the Divine will and presence.

am in Modern History by Wilfred Cantwell Smith. nceton University Press. 317 pp. $6.00.

A picture of the Islamic world in a state of crisis and transition emerges from these pages, as the author examines the relation of the Muslim's faith to contemporary problems.

mmunism and Nationalism in the Middle East by lter Z. Laqueur. Praeger. 362 pp. $6.50.

A realistic appraisal of Russia's influence in the Middle East, this work is particularly absorbing when it stresses the susceptibility to Communism of the student "intelligentsia."

History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky. nslated by Max Eastman. The University of Michigan Press. 2 pp. $12.50.

In one of the year's major publishing enterprises, this classic study of an epochal event is made available for the first time in a one-volume edition.

Memoirs of a Revolutionist by Dwight Macdonald. ar, Straus and Cudahy. 376 pp. $4.75.

A collection of past essays in political criticism by one of our most authoritative journalists, this book gives an uninhibited view of left-wing thought and activity over the last two decades.

itics and the Novel by Irving Howe. Meridian Books. pp. $1.35.

Political themes and implications in the work of such novelists as Stendhal, Dostoevsky, James, Malraux, Koestler, and Orwell are illuminated in an arresting study by a brilliant critic.

Imre Nagy on Communism: In Defense of the New Course. Praeger. 306 pp. $5.50.

Principles and theories of Communism written in 1955 and 1956 by the former Premier of Hungary, these essays reveal the growing demand for liberalization within the Communist system.

Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power by Karl A. Wittfogel. Yale University Press. 556 pp. $7.50.

The thesis of this study is that Oriental Despotism, so called because of its place of origin, is a form of total political and economic power that tends to flourish in "hydraulic societies." This theory is interestingly connected with a discussion by the author of the "Asian mode of production," as seen by Marx and Lenin.

Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy by Robert E. Osgood. The University of Chicago Press. 313 pp. $5.00.

As a way out of the dilemma of our present national policies, Mr. Osgood suggests that "the only rational course is to develop a strategy capable of limiting warfare and fighting limited wars successfully." But, he continues, this strategy "demands revision of the country's traditional approach to war and to the use of military power."

Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power by Howard K. Beale. The Johns Hopkins Press. 600 pp. $6.00.

A study of our first period of expansion in world affairs, this exhaustively documented book is valuable for its full-length portrait of Roosevelt and for its insights into the complex imperatives behind our emergence as a major power.

The Supreme Court: Constitutional Revolution in Retrospect by Bernard Schwartz. The Ronald Press. 429 pp. $6.50.

An important contribution to legal scholarship, this work analyzes the significant shifts in the Court's function since 1937. Accounts of the major cases handled by the Court over the years are also provided.

COMMUNITY IN THE WORLD

Human Rights Day

December 10 marks the Tenth Anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This year, as in years past, the President of the United States is expected to issue a proclamation calling attention to the anniversary and asking all Americans to join with the free nations of the world in celebrating it. In addition, the governors of the forty-eight states are being asked to issue similar proclamations.

The emphasis this year will be on educational institutions, teachers, and other groups concerned with education, in order to lay the groundwork for a widespread and effective observance.

Materials for the observance of Human Rights Day include fact sheets, posters, wall charts, radio spot announcements, a guide book for community leaders, and a booklet entitled "How Children Learn About Human Rights." These materials are available free of charge to interested individuals and organizations, and may be obtained by writing to the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

"Great Decisions, 1958"

Several million Americans throughout the country, as private citizens and as members of community organizations, will soon be focusing their attention on eight critical issues in United States foreign policy, according to the Foreign Policy Association.

"Great Decisions, 1958," a nationwide community study offered by the Association, will enable citizens of some five hundred communities to discuss and reach informed opinions on international problems affecting this nation's security and welfare.

Civic organizations, churches, schools, libraries, colleges and general and cooperative extension services are currently spearheading plans for the eight-week educational program which begins February 2, 1958. Also cooperating in this citizen education effort are state and local chapters of such national organizations as the League of Women Voters and the U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce, plus some three hundred newspapers and a considerable number of radio and television stations.

The eight topics to be considered during the program will deal with Russia, disarmament, united Europe, the Middle East, Africa, U.S. foreign economic policy, Red China and the United Nations. Community-wide informal home discussion will form the core of the program. Last year in the state of Oregon over four thousand persons participated in "Great Decisions" discussion groups, with coordinated broadcasts by twenty-eight radio and television stations in various communities.

The Foreign Policy Association assists by distributing a wide variety of organizational and educational materials, including bibliographies, opinion ballots, and film and speaker lists. For further information, write the Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.

At the United Nations

With its Twelfth General Assembly about two-thirds over, the United Nations has set itself a full agenda. To be considered by the Assembly's key Political Committee before the December 14 target date lie Korea, West New Guinea, Algeria, Cyprus, and a new Soviet item on peaceful coexistence among nations. The items will be considered in that order.

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